

A Philosophical Appraisal of Gottfried von Leibniz's Notion of God's Existence and the Problem of Evil in the World.

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ABSTRACT

Gottfried von Leibniz offered a cosmological argument to reinstate the existence of God and also explain why theodicy does not bother apply to his scheme. In spite of the novel and penetrating analysis provided by Leibniz, his work has received critical analysis from Bertrand Russell who maintains that the proposal of Leibniz is both confusing and scandalous. Russell furthers the objections of minds such as David Hume who place premium on ideas that are capable of objective verifiability. It is the admission of the present research that the objections leveled against Leibniz is derived from the metaphysics of substance, which is the most common and dominant basis for perceiving the world. When one considers the improvement of Whitehead's improvement of Leibniz's ideas, it becomes clear that Leibniz's reflection on the place of God and evil in the world fares better especially when compared with how classical theology has failed to reconcile the evidence of evil with the existence of a benevolent deity.

Keywords: Theodicy, Gottfried von Leibniz, God, Alfred North Whitehead, Metaphysics

INTRODUCTION

In this research, we examine the reflections of [1] in a newer perspective in the light of the urgency to both understand the place of God in the actual world and His permissiveness of evil. We argue that the metaphysical framework of Leibniz was unpopular as at the time of his writing and this accounts for why his ideas is similar to what [2] calls "sophistry and illusion" and why [3] concludes that Leibniz's system is scandalous and confused. We therefore appraise Leibniz's thoughts on God and theodicy from the improvements done to his view by [4] to corroborate why we admit that his ideas were not properly grasped and to also disclose how relevant they are for having a better grasp of the actual world and its *modus operandi* [5]. For the purpose stated in the fore, we begin with a brief exposition of Leibniz on God and evil in the world. We then turn to the objection usually raised against (i.e. the Hume's Fork) Leibniz and the one from Russell, both of which are very

critical. In the last part of the study, we attempt to reconstruct the metaphysics of Leibniz owing to the improvement upon it by Whitehead to argue that Leibniz was thinking far beyond his peers, hence why he could not be discerned but subjected to destructive criticisms [6].

Gottfried von Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason, God and the Reality of Evil: It is instructive to relay that Leibniz's idea of God as an existent may be classed under the rubrics of cosmological arguments for the existence of God. In natural theology, a cosmological argument is an argument in which the existence of a unique being, generally identified with or referred to as God, is deduced or inferred as highly probable from facts or alleged facts concerning causation, change, motion, contingency, or finitude in respect of the universe as a whole or processes within it [7]. The cosmological argument is closely related to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) as addressed by Gottfried

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Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, itself a modern exposition of the claim that “nothing comes from nothing” attributed to Parmenides [8]. It is worthy to further that the PSR was added to the three traditional laws of thought in classical logic [9]. While commenting on this law, Sir William Hamilton chronicles: “In modern times, the attention of philosophers was called to this law of Leibnitz, who, on the two principles of Reason and Contradiction, founded the whole edifice of his philosophy” [10]. This law says: “Every true thought should be sufficiently substantiated” [11]. In a recent formulation, the law of sufficient reason is depicted thus: “For every substantive fact Y there are some facts, the Xs, such that (i) the Xs ground Y and (ii) each one of the Xs is autonomous” [12]. In plain language this means, every event must have a reason or a cause. This is a principle that is present in the reflections of Anaximander, Archimedes, Cicero, Avicenna, Aquinas and even Spinoza. It is however to the credit of Leibniz that it was first codified and employed rigorously to explain the phenomena. When we consider Leibniz’s PSR from the domain of how the world operates, it is apparent that there must be a cause for the world. And this cause, Leibniz takes as God. The principle of sufficient reason is used by Leibniz as a proof of God. According to this principle, there is a sufficient reason why things are exactly as they are and are not otherwise. To see how the proof works, consider any occurrence whatsoever, say, the leaves falling from the trees in autumn [13].

According to the principle in question, there must be a sufficient reason for that occurrence. Now, a *partial* reason for any occurrence is that something else happened, or is happening, that caused or is causing the occurrence—in our example, the days turning cold. But that happening is only a *partial* reason for the occurrence in question because it, too, requires a sufficient reason for happening. Why did the days turn cold? So it is plain, thought Leibniz, that as long as you seek the sufficient reason for an occurrence from within the sequence of happenings or events, you never get the complete, final, sufficient reason for the occurrence [14]. You only get to some other event, and that itself needs a reason for having happened. (The days turned cold because of a shift southward in the jet stream. The jet stream shifted southward because of a reduction in solar radiation. The solar radiation was reduced because of changes in the earth’s orientation relative to the sun. And so forth.) So, unless there is something *outside* the series of events, some reason for the *entire series itself*, there is no sufficient reason for *any* occurrence [15]. Therefore, reasoned Leibniz, because there is a sufficient reason for every occurrence, it follows that there is something outside the series of events that is its own sufficient reason. And this “something outside,” of course, is God. Further, because God is a sufficient reason for God’s own existence, God is a *necessary* being, for Leibniz [16.17]. As [18] himself puts it:

The extraordinary concourse of God is comprised in what our essence expresses, for this expression extends to everything, but it surpasses the forces of our nature or our distinct expression, which is finite and follows certain subordinate maxims. . . Miracles and the extraordinary concourses of God have this peculiarity, that they cannot be foreseen by the reasoning of any created spirit, however enlightened it might be, because distinct comprehension of the general order surpasses all of them: whereas everything that is called natural depends on less general maxims that creatures can understand.

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In this way, then, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, coupled with the fact that something has occurred or is occurring, leads straightaway to a necessary being, God at least according to Leibniz. This proof is yet another cosmological argument, and it is very much like Aquinas's third way. In fact, there is a tendency in the literature to interpret Aquinas's third way in this Leibnizian mode. Further, Leibniz's "argument from sufficient reason" is thought by many contemporary philosophers to be the soundest cosmological argument and the soundest proof of God of any type ever put forward [19]. Perhaps this derives from the accentuation that is given to the necessary truths which Leibniz believes to also emanate from this necessary being. In his very words: "And when God displays a truth to us, we come to possess the truth which is in his understanding, for although his ideas are infinitely more perfect and extensive than ours, they still have the same relationships that ours do [20]. The foregoing is anchored on Leibniz's conviction that the present world is necessary hypothetically, but not absolutely. Since it is what it is, it follows that it will be what it will be. But causality, which connects one state of the world with the next, never shows why there is any world at all. Even if we suppose the eternity of the world, we cannot escape the necessity for some reason of the whole series; though each state follows from the preceding, we never get a sufficient reason why there are any states at all [21]. Hence there must be some extramundane reason of things. The whole collection of finite existents is contingent, and therefore demands a sufficient reason ; but this cannot be found within the series, since every term is contingent, and itself requires a sufficient reason. Hence the sufficient reason of all contingents must be itself not contingent, but metaphysically necessary. Moreover the

reason of the existing can only be derived from the existing. Hence the metaphysically necessary sufficient reason of all contingents must be a necessary existent, i.e. a Being whose essence involves existence ; and this can only be God [22]. So here is the problem! If God is a necessary existent or being who is infinitely more perfect, how do we account for evil in the world? Granted the problem is not new, it is to the credit of Leibniz that it was christened 'Theodicy,' as a "word for an argument in defense of God's goodness despite the existence of evil" [23]. Perhaps a little of bit expatiation to understand the extent of this metaphysical problem will assist the thrust of this essay. As we had already hinted that the problem of evil has been discoursed by philosophers before Leibniz, it is instructive to admit that the question was first poked by Epicurus. Epicurus holds that the supposed attributes of God do not reconcile with the existence of evil. In his argument quoted by David Hume in the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, one gleans that: "Epicurus old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?" [24]. From ancient times, scholars have tried to tend to these questions - affirming the existence of a good and knowing God tandem with the reality of evil. In recent times however, the philosophical discourse(s) about the problem of evil has branched into the logical and evidential problems of evil, with scholars working within each and/or both orientations. The logical problem of evil's early shape for contemporary analytic philosophy of religion was provided by [25]. The logical problem of evil (also called a priori problem and deductive problem) "challenged theists to clarify key terms and formulate effective strategies to reconcile the propositions in question" [26]. The propositions concern

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the reconciliation between a good, all powerful and knowing God on the one hand and the reality of evil and suffering in the world on the other hand. Have they been able to achieve this feat satisfactorily? This is doubtful. Perhaps it is this doubt that led to the discourse on

... in light of the horrendous suffering that is to be found in our universe - e.g., the rape, torture, and murder of babies and young children, the excruciating suffering and deaths of animals in bushfires and other natural disasters, and so forth - many atheists suppose that there is very good reason to judge that, if there is a being that has sovereignty over our universe, then that being is either unable to prevent horrendous suffering (and hence certainly not omnipotent), or uninformed about the horrendous suffering that there is in our world (and hence certainly not omniscient), or falls far short of moral perfection (because indifferent to the horrendous suffering, or delighting in the horrendous suffering, or whatever) [28].

This essay finds that both the logical and evidential problems of evil derive from similar assumptions. This may be expanded to mean that scholars working in each orientation have taken as canon some claims which are not true or in the words of Charles Hartshorne, "theological mistakes" [29]. These assumptions/mistakes are entrenched in the attributes of God. In agreement with the finding of Murray and Rea, one might first take note of the fact popular theistic traditions almost all agree on the following basic claims about God: "Nothing made God, and God is the source or ground of everything other than God; God rules all that is not God; and God is the most perfect being" [30]. But how specifically did Leibniz respond to the challenge of theodicy? It needs to be recalled that [31] subscribed to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which logically entails (he thought) that God exists. It also requires that this must be the most perfect of all possible worlds, for otherwise God would not have chosen this world for existence [32]. It is therefore pertinent to Leibniz to explain how evil entered the entire scheme. [33],

the evidential problem of evil [27]. The evidential problem of evil on the other hand, queries the affinity between horrendous sufferings in the universe and the supposed attributes of God. According to Graham Oppy:

primary articulation is that, for God to create things other than Himself, the created things logically must be limited and imperfect. Thus, to the extent that creation is imperfect, it is not wholly good, and thus it is "evil." This means that God, as a necessary and sufficient existent is perfect and other things He created, which are not perfect and limited account for the evil that persists in the actual world. This line of reasoning has however come under serious criticisms. We consider two main objections to this reasoning within the section that follows. **David Hume, Bertrand Russell and the Critique of Leibniz's Reflections:** The discourse on God and theodicy, as briefly enunciated in the preceding section has gathered criticisms, which have made the appreciation and understanding of Leibniz's philosophy to wane. The articulation of Leibniz falls squarely within the space of ideas that are castigated by Hume's Fork which has come to serve as foundational for nearly all attempts to extinguish metaphysical ideas as Leibniz's. Simply put, the Hume's Fork only recognize as knowledge, reasoning concerning quantity or

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning containing quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion [15].

Aside the foregoing, Hume as also critical of the kind of cosmological argument that Leibniz is sympathetic to, especially due to the accentuation on causation. A cosmological argument, for Hume examines, affirms that anything that exists must have a cause (or reason or explanation) that is different from itself and this is precisely what Leibniz also maintains. However, due to the series of causes, one cannot go *ad infinitum* for there must be a first uncaused cause, God. A variation of the basic argument allows that the causal series can go to infinity but still stands in need of an uncaused cause that causes the whole infinite series [8]. Thus, the uncaused cause is a necessary being. Hume levels two main rebuttals to this reasoning. For [11], the universe may itself be the necessarily existent being and we need not infer a deity. Secondly, Hume stresses that if one maintains that everything has a prior cause, it is contradictory also to maintain that there was a first cause. The implication is that causes should be infinite. This is the underlying implication in Leibniz's PSR [17]. With these points, it is clear that the understanding of God and the reality of evil in Leibniz systems continue to be enigmatic and far from appreciation and comprehension. The objections of Bertrand Russell are even more potent. [20], attacks bitterly, Leibniz's notion of God's existence and all the logical implications that may be inferred from it. Russell affirms that Leibniz's proposal is open to attack on the ground that, if the

reason of an existent can only be some other existent, then the ontological argument cannot be valid. "For in eternal things it must be understood that, even if there were no cause, there is a reason, which, in enduring things, is necessity itself or essence" [23]. Thus it is only the reason of a contingent existent that must be an existent. But this can only be on the ground that the reason of the contingent must be one that inclines, but does not necessitate, which is, indeed, of the very essence of contingency. Accordingly, when God's necessary existence has been obtained, the world of contingents must not follow -from it necessarily. It follows that God's volitions must be contingent, for they necessarily attain their effects, and if these effects are to be contingent it can only be, therefore, because the volitions are contingent. The volitions themselves, therefore, require a sufficient reason, which inclines but does not necessitate. This is found in God's goodness. It is held that God is free to do evil, but does not do so [24]. But God's goodness itself must be supposed necessary. Thus the contingency of existential propositions rests ultimately upon the assertion that God does not necessarily do good [11]. God's good actions, in fact, have to be conceived as a collection of particular existents, each having a sufficient reason in his goodness. Or else we may place their sufficient reason in his wisdom, namely in his knowledge of the good, which is a knowledge of necessary propositions. God's goodness, Leibniz says, led him to

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desire to create the good, his wisdom showed him the best possible, and his power enabled him to create it [19]. This led [16] to adduce that: "God, according to Leibniz, sees not only individual monads and their various states, but also

the relations between monads, and in this consists the reality of relations." This is why Russell considers that this is the weakest part of Leibniz's ideas. As he puts it:

I COME now to the weakest part in Leibniz's philosophy, the part most full of inconsistencies. Whatever, in the doctrine we have examined, seemed arbitrary, or in need of further explanation, was easily explained by the lazy device of reference to an Omnipotent Creator. And not only unavoidable difficulties, but others which might have been avoided, were left, because they reinforced the arguments upon which Leibniz's orthodoxy loved to dwell. A philosophy of substance, we may say generally, should be either a monism or a monadism. A monism is necessarily pantheistic, and a monadism, when it is logical, is as necessarily atheistic. Leibniz, however, felt any philosophy to be worthless which did not establish the existence of God, and it cannot be denied that certain gaps in his system were patched up by a reference to the Divine Power, Goodness and Wisdom. Let us now examine what the arguments were by which this result was attained. There are four distinct arguments, in Leibniz, which attempt to prove the existence of God. Only one of these, so far as I know, was invented by him, and that was the worst of the four. They are : The Ontological Argument, the Cosmological Argument, the Argument from the Eternal Truths, and the Argument from the Pre-established Harmony [23].

Russell then proceeds to expose his comprehension of the arguments of Leibniz and then reveal the problems that he sees in it. Whereas the cosmological argument which Leibniz gave was popular

called the 'Principle of Sufficient Reason', [30] prefers to label it as 'Principle of Pre-Established Harmony'. In the words of [25]:

The proof from the pre-established harmony is a particular form of the so-called physico-theological proof, otherwise known as the argument from design. This is the argument of the Bridgewater Treatises, and of popular theology generally. Being more palpably inadequate than any of the others, it has acquired a popularity which they have never enjoyed [25].

The world is so well constructed, we are told, that it must have had a highly skilful Architect. In Leibniz's form, the argument states that the harmony of all the monads can only have arisen from a common cause [32]. That they should all exactly

synchronize, can only be explained by a Creator who pre-determined their synchronism. Let us see what this theory involves. There are, roughly speaking, two functions which a Christian God has to fulfill. He has to be a providence and a

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Creator. Leibniz merged the first of these functions in the second, though he often denied that he had done so. God, he says, is the soul's immediate external object, and is able to act directly on the soul, though apparently he very seldom does so [33]. All the grounds against the interaction of substances are, as we saw, grounds giving metaphysical necessity, and therefore applying equally against God's action on the world. We will therefore suppose that God is the Creator, and that his Providence is shown only in creating the best possible world [30]. Hence, Russell's conclusion: "This argument I can only describe as scandalous" [31]. In this history of Western philosophy, when minds such as Hume and Russell provide penetrating arguments against a philosophy, it is most likely that their objections are taken to be cardinal. However, it is instructive to offer that Leibniz's system was not well articulated by Leibniz himself and this served the basis for the lack of its understanding and appreciation. When we consider the improvements done to the system by Whitehead, and then return to Leibniz again, the system then begins to provide a better outlook for understanding the actual world.

Whitehead's Reformed Metaphysics as an Improvement of Leibniz's Discourse on God and Evil: For our task in this chapter, it will be helpful to begin with the understanding that historically

Within philosophy, perfect-being theology traces its roots at least as far back as Plato, who identifies God with the supreme reality, which he labels "the Good" and Aristotle, who characterizes God as "the best substance." These traditions converged in powerful ways to inform the writing of some of the most important theologians in each tradition: Philo of Alexandria and Maimonides in Judaism, Al-Kindi and Avicenna in Islam, and Augustine, Anselm, and St. Thomas Aquinas in Christianity.

As Aristotle, the philosopher whose metaphysic has been most influential in traditional theism hints, God thinks only of himself which renders his perfection intact. To think of any other diminishes

speaking, there are two types of metaphysics: substance and process [8]. The former has taken more vantage over the latter. Unfortunately, the latter has usually been assessed from the perspective of the former and this is why it has been adduced as scandalous and confusion of our understanding of the world. Perhaps this is why process philosophers argue that the history of Western philosophy has given undue importance to substance over process, Being over becoming, especially among those philosophical systems where movement, change, and transformation are nothing but attributes, effects, or derivatives of what is permanent or changeless. To a certain degree, substance metaphysics owes its success to the mode of thinking that cultivates such a mentality, that is to say, in ancient times, perfection was synonymous to changelessness [17]. This notion of perfection and its synonymy with changelessness served as the backdrop for monotheistic theologies. The traditional understanding of God as the unchanging and passionless absolute is derived primarily from the Greeks who upheld that "perfection" implies complete "immutability" or lack of change [16]. This is an idea that has been termed as perfect being theology. On the main thrust of perfect being theology, [18] chorus:

this perfection. For Aristotle, God, the first mover, who is an immaterial substance must enjoy bliss. His activity for Aristotle must be intellectual and the object of his reflection must be the best

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possible. Hence, "it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking upon thinking" [11]. In conclusion, Aristotle validates: "we say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continues and eternal belong to God; for this is God" [16]. The God that thinks of nothing but himself is far from the kind of God widespread among the Abrahamic monotheisms. Theirs is a God that actively engages the world unlike the deistic stance implied in Aristotle's God. In similar ways, Aristotle's teacher, [19] too holds that God, out of his perfection cannot be changed by other things or by

Leibniz himself did not achieve this naturalism, because his monads were "windowless," having no openings to be influenced by each other. Their apparent interaction had to be explained as a harmony pre - established by God. *Whitehead modified the Leibnizian structure by installing windows* (Emphasis ours).

Furthermore, Whitehead interchanges what Leibniz calls monads, the basic structure of reality into what he calls actual entities or occasions. The primary actualities that Whitehead terms 'actual entities' are in his own words: "the final real things of which the world is made. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real" [17]. Thus, Whitehead may be interpreted in this excerpt to be doing away with the traditional notion of substance which maintains identity in the face of flux [17].

They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there are gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level

Now that we have been able to establish the connection between Leibniz and Whitehead and how the former influenced the latter, we shall now consider how Whitehead strives to overcome some of the objections leveled against Leibniz as he produces a more encompassing and

...it is not the case that there is an actual world which accidentally begins to exhibit an order of nature. There

Himself. It is to the credit of Whitehead who was inspired by the reflections of Leibniz on the existence of God and the reality of evil that process metaphysics is able to birth a platform that insures the 'cash-value' and validity in Leibniz's ideas, which had already been critically deposed. How or where do the systems of each of Leibniz and Whitehead intersect? In what specific ways do the reflections of Leibniz attain improvement from Whitehead? David Ray Griffin, a foremost Whiteheadian, points at the nature of monads as the starting point, connection and influence of Leibniz on Whitehead. For [18]:

Unlike the monads of Leibniz that are windowless and do not interact, [19] reveals gave them 'windows' which allows for them to interact and interpenetrate one another leading to a grand whole connection in the actual world. In spite of these distinctions and inspirations from Leibniz, Whitehead maintains that all things are actual entities, including God, humans, stone and other seemingly lifeless objects though with levels of gradations. As [20] argues:

grand understanding of the interactions of God and the world with the reality of evil too. To begin with, Whitehead believes that the world has adequate reasons for maintaining the existence of God. In his words:

is an actual world because there is order in nature. If there were no order, there would be no world. Also, since there is a world, we know that there is an order. The ordering entity is a necessary element in the metaphysical situation presented by the actual world [16].

The fusion of Greek thought with classical theology to explain away the reality of evil is obvious in the reflections of [20]. For him, evil is the absence of that which is good. His attempt to rescue a good God from initiating evil led him to pronounce thus: "But, if you know or if you believe that God is good...then God does no evil" [25]. What is implied here is that God created the *possibility* but not the *necessity* of evil. Even when God could have prevented evil in the universe, it was allowed because God knew it was better to allow evil than to exclude it absolutely [28]. For Augustine evil persists in the world owing to *privation* and *pervasion* [29]. The former is primordial and ontological from creation whereas the latter which is anthropological derives from human sinfulness and freewill.

The Augustinian tradition has semblance with the treatment of evil in the process tradition only for the former's retention of the idea that God created the world *ex-nihilo* (creation theology); that God is a perfect being (perfect-being theology); and that the world needs God but not the other way round (Providential theology). These three starting points of traditional theism or classical theology were discerned from Greek thinking. From these accidents, the idea of an all-powerful, knowing and seeing God filtered into classical theology. Reacting to this infiltration, Alfred Whitehead relays: "...the deeper idolatry, of the fashioning of God in the image of the Egyptian, Persian and Roman imperial rulers, [which] was retained. The Church gave unto God, the attributes which belonged exclusively to Caesar" [30]. Traditional theism holds dear, the metaphysical backdrop of a perfect nature of God. However, the implication of

importing this feature into traditional theism attests to a God enmeshed in His perfection with little or no consideration for what is not God. Traditional theism has managed to wield influence in the face of this inconsistency. It has conjured a God that has the capacity to affect the world at will. One way that traditional theism justifies 'divine coercion' is what has been termed as divine action. The metaphysics of substance, which had been employed by traditional theologians, since the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, obviously has done more harm than good to an appreciation of divine agency. It falls short, failing to provide a comprehensive rationale for not only the origin of evil, but its persistence in the actual world. How and why, should the consumption of one apple, just one apple by Eve and Adam, lead to the tumultuous chaos in the world from the Garden of Eden to the bombs detonated in Paris, Mogadishu and Timbuktu? Classical theology depreciates aspects of the revealed texts that portray God as a persuasive agent. In addition, Aristotelian (or substance) metaphysics has been taken canonical by traditional theologians to argue that God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-present, thereby initiating the philosophical problem of evil. We tender that these inadequacies created atheists and the urge to start proposing proofs for the existence of God, replete in the dominant Western tradition of philosophy of religion [31]. The foregoing are testaments, the urgency that traditional theology needs to be reviewed from the perspective of process metaphysics as to appreciate the place of humanity and God in the grand scheme of things in the universe. In this guise, [16] have argued impressively the

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metaphysical inconsistencies in traditional theism and why process theology is pertinent. It is imperative to offer that God in process theology is not laced with absolute adjectives. Hence, since God is not all-powerful, all-knowing and all-present, the philosophical problem of evil does not arise. Evil in process theology is a consequence of persuasive agency wherein actual entities either conform or not conform to eternal objects persistently initiated by God for their prehension and self-determination. In other words, through his persuasive power, God gently lures creatures in the face of any moral situation towards that actualization of the best in that occasion.

The foregoing analysis reveals how process metaphysics is able to overcome the problem of the existence of God and give a subtle answer to the age long philosophical problem of evil. It is also clear that Leibniz was critically assessed by scholars who are steeped in the substance way of conceiving reality. Until Whitehead entered the discursive fray and improved Leibniz's ideas, it is now glaring

God offers the choices to them, with claims to rightness and moral goodness. However, since God is persuasive, He does not completely determine what that manner by which the individual uses his freedom in response to God's persuasive lure. It is on this account that the individual is responsible for what he chooses to actualize [15]. If it is the case that God wants what is best for the world, and there is evil in the world, process theology says the evil is a result of deviation from what God intends for the world. Evil surfaces "as a result of the individual deviating from what God intends for him, which is in fact the best" [26].

CONCLUSION

how one can have a very good understanding of the world, the role of God and the place of evil. It is therefore not an error to submit as does this essay that no philosophy, in spite of the flaws inherent in it is entirely useless. Whitehead has demonstrated this truth using the reflections of Leibniz on God and evil in the world to provide us with a more grounding theoretical framework.

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